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The UK and 'genocide' in Biafra
In late August 1968, just after it launched a 'final offensive' to defeat the 'Biafra' rebels, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) announced it would allow an International Observer Team into the country to show that it was not pursuing a campaign of genocide against Igbos in Biafra.
1 It did so under some pressure to take such a course of action: the British government had signalled strongly that its continued support for the FMG, including arms supplies, would depend on the FMG's acceptance of observers.
From September 1968 until the end of the war in January 1970, a small team of observers from the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Poland, Sweden, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) operated in FMG-controlled territory and repeatedly reported that no genocide was taking place in the country. The British government used those findings to justify its policy of support for the FMG.
The observer team hardly features in recent discussions of the Nigeria-Biafra war, or even in some older pieces. 2 Only Suzanne Cronje discussed it at much length, in The world and Nigeria. 3 Yet it is curious that the observer team was sent at all, as it is an indication of how much pressure the UK itself was under as a result of the claims that a genocide was being perpetrated against Biafrans.
This article explains why the UK pressed for the FMG to invite observers into Nigeria, highlighting the need for the British government to rebut accusations that it was abetting genocide in Nigeria, especially by continuing to supply arms to the FMG. These accusations generated concern within the government despite the fact that the UK had not yet acceded to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Their concern stemmed not from questions about the UK's conformity to the legal norm against genocide, but instead from doubts about its conformity with the social norm against genocide.
This article first sets out the argument that there are two norms against genocide, a legal one (embodied in the 1948 Genocide Convention) and a social one. The main part of the article then reveals the decision-making and diplomacy regarding the creation of the observer team -as disclosed in the relevant papers in the UK National Archives. The social norm created pressures on the government to take action that it viewed as inimical to its interests (such as imposing an arms embargo on the FMG), and thus it needed specifically to rebut the claims of genocide to relieve the pressure. The section also shows how the observer team's conclusions were used by the UK government to justify its policy (and to resist any changes to it), while activists and observers argued the observer team was biased. This case illustrates how and why it is difficult to use observer teams to ensure an 'objective' determination of whether genocide is taking place or not.
The social and legal norms against genocide
This article uses the concept of 'norms' when assessing the impact that the claims about genocide in Nigeria had on British foreign policy. Norms are 'collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity'. 4 Norms can have different impacts on states: they can require action (to comply with the norm), constrain action (again, to comply with the norm), and enable action (which could be justified as in compliance with the norm). 5 However, norms may also have little or no impact on states:
in other words, states' behaviour may not conform with the norm at all, and they may resist pressure or incentives to take action in accordance with the norm. This may be 4 because the costs of so doing are perceived to be greater than the costs of not conforming to the norm. There are also different types of norms -legal, social, professional, cultural, and so on -and they may have different influences on states. 6 As I have argued elsewhere, there are two norms against genocide, a legal one and a social one. 7 The legal norm is set out in the Genocide Convention, which provides a definition of genocide and a set of rules by which states are to punish and prevent genocide. The definition of genocide in the convention is widely considered to be constricting, with its demanding requirement to prove 'intent to destroy'. Furthermore the convention does not mandate any particular action with respect to 'prevention', instead setting out certain requirements regarding the punishment of individuals for carrying out acts of genocide.
The UK's attitude towards the Genocide Convention was lukewarm in 1948, and for twenty years afterwards. It abstained in the UN Sixth Committee vote on the convention, and then very nearly abstained from voting on it in the General Assembly, because of concerns that acceptance of the convention into British law would require changes to the laws on granting asylum and the Cabinet had not agreed to this. Though the UK did in the end vote for the convention, the British delegate told the General
Assembly that the UK's vote was without prejudice to the right to grant asylum. 8 The UK did not sign the convention, 9 and only moved to accede to it after Harold Wilson became prime minister in 1964. Until then, a bureaucratic standoff between the Foreign Office (in favour of accession due to the reputational costs of remaining aloof) and the Home Office (adamant that there was no support for changing the UK's law on asylum) had prevented accession. Wilson, however, supported accession and after he assumed office, his government put the convention forward for approval by parliament, though not until 1968. 10 The main debate on the convention in the House of Commons took place in February 1969; the UK formally acceded to it on 30 January 1970.
There is little evidence of British government concern about any legal requirements that the UK might have vis-à-vis Nigeria as a result of accession to the Genocide Convention. Indeed, the Foreign Office was confident that accession would not lead to claims that the UK was violating the convention by supporting the FMG, because the observer team had proven that FMG was not committing genocide. 11 Had the observer team not been dispatched to Nigeria and found no evidence of genocide, then it is possible that when the UK acceded to the convention, it could have been accused by Biafra's supporters of contravening its legal obligations. 12 But there is no evidence in the files in the UK National Archives or parliamentary debates to suggest that the question of accession to the convention was linked to decisions about the observer team.
What this indicates is that the legal norm played little to no role in the British government's considerations of either its vulnerability to criticism over its policy regarding Nigeria, or its defence of its policy. Nor did the legal norm figure highly in public contestation of the policy. Instead, the case of the UK and genocide in Biafra illustrates the impact that social norms can have on foreign policy-making. Those interests were economic in the first place: 'secession would threaten the security of the 3,500 subjects in the Eastern region and put investments at risk, especially in the oil industry'. 18 Shell-British Petroleum was a major investor in Nigeria, and over a tenth of British oil imports came from Nigeria. 19 In comparison, at the start of the conflict, the US had refused to supply arms to either side (arguably an easier decision than that facing the UK, given that the US had not been a major arms supplier to Nigeria), 26 in June 1968 France and the Netherlands announced an arms embargo on Nigeria (though within two months the French government was supplying arms to Biafra), and a month later Belgium did so. 27 As discussed further below, the Wilson government came under considerable pressure to halt arms sales to the FMG, and was facing accusations that by not halting arms sales, it was aiding a government that was engaging in genocide. The rest of this article explores why and how the Wilson government tried to 'square the circle' by combating the accusations of genocide and continuing its support for the FMG. it could help persuade the Biafrans to surrender because their safety would be guaranteed by the external force. 34 The idea was pushed principally by the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Arnold Smith, who was attempting to arrange a ceasefire and negotiations between the two sides. The UK was in principle willing to contribute, but only if certain conditions were met first, including that Canada would help pay for the force, and India and Ghana would contribute to it. 35 In the end, however, the idea did not gather enough support -in Nigeria or the rest of the Commonwealth. Instead, during the course of the summer 1968, the proposal was transformed into the idea of sending observers from the International Committee of the Red Cross or other governments who would monitor the FMG's conduct of the war. 36 Throughout the first half of 1968, opposition to British policy increased -as concern grew also about the accusations of genocide in Nigeria. In particular, the government's defence of arms sales was criticised intensely inside and outside parliament. If we make the supposition that it were the intention of the Federal
Accusations of genocide in Nigeria and opposition to UK arms sales
Government not merely to preserve the unity of Nigeria but to proceed without mercy either with the slaughter or the starvation of the Ibo people, or if we were to make the supposition that it were the intention of the Federal Government to take advantage of a military situation in order to throw aside with contempt any terms of reasonable settlement, then the arguments which justified the policy we have so far pursued would fall, and we would have to reconsider, and more than reconsider, the action we have so far taken. 47 The British government needed not only to defend arms sales to the FMG, but also to indicate that it would stop supplying arms if the FMG appeared to be slaughtering Igbos.
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Arguably this shows the impact of the social norm: if slaughter -or genocide as some supporters of Biafra termed it -is happening, then government policy must change.
The same message about the conditions for continued British support was given directly by Wilson to the Federal Nigerian Commissioner for Information and Labour, Chief Anthony Enaharo, in a meeting following the 12 June debate. At the same time,
Wilson also asked what the FMG's views were on the possible stationing of a Commonwealth observer force before a ceasefire were in place, and was told only that the FMG would consider it. 48 After the FMG publicly announced that it was launching the 'final push' to defeat the Biafrans on 26 August, there was an uproar in the House of Commons, and a noisy demonstration outside it. The House of Commons has been recalled to discuss the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, but the government had been successfully pressed into adding a day during which there could be a debate on Nigeria. That debate occurred on 27 August. It was particularly uncomfortable for the government. Office on the proposal for observers. 52 The paper suggested that the federal government might find it helpful to have a small number of outside observers attached to their own forces at this stage in the campaign. … The main purpose of such observers would be to demonstrate that the Federal authorities were not seeking to conceal the truth and to provide a degree of objective and authoritative checking on future propaganda stories about misconduct by Federal troops, so that world opinion could be quickly reassured about the true facts in a supposed incident.
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The International Red Cross would be the most suitable organisation to arrange for such observers.
Two days later, the Nigerian High Commissioner told Thomson that they were to make an announcement about international observers that very day. 54 Thus, although various UK ministers and diplomats portrayed the observer team as having been proposed by the FMG -not only did the British push for the Nigerians to take such a move, but they made it clear the kind of team desired. However, Stremlau suggests that the Nigerian head of state, Yakubu Gowon, agreed to invite in observers 'to show his good faith' -given that British arms exporters had already committed themselves to delivering arms months in advance, he was not under serious pressure to comply with the British demands, plus he could also purchase equipment from Russia.
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Of more relevance to this article is that the Wilson government needed the FMG to agree to observers to reduce the pressure it was under at home and abroad, as one official indicated in an internal request for funding a third observer:
The The creation of the observer team indicates that the social norm against genocide had an impact, though not exactly the one hoped for by the British government's criticsthe government needed to prove that genocide was not being perpetrated in Nigeria. This would enable it to continue to support the FMG, including by selling arms to it. The social norm had enough of an impact to prompt a response to the concerns about genocide, but not enough to prompt a change in policy (suspension of arms supplies).
The Observer Team
The formal invitation from the Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs was directed to Canada, Poland, Sweden, the UK, the OAU, and the UN Secretary-General. 57 60 The Nigerian government would not agree, however, to allow the observer team to operate in Biafra (assuming the Biafrans would allow them to do so), even though many MPs and some officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office tried to push for this. 61 Allowing the observers to operate in Biafra would confer status on the rebels. 62 Between September 1968 and January 1970, the observers periodically issued reports on their activities, which included visits to displaced persons camps, prisoner of war camps, and villages that had been retaken by Nigerian federal forces. Their reports invariably found no evidence of genocide. The first report, of 2 October 1968, concluded that 'There is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or their property, and the use of the term genocide is in no way justified.' 63 Every subsequent report repeated that message. 64 
Using the Observer Team's Findings to Justify Policy
The British government considered that the observer team had performed the important task of proving there was no genocide, thus enabling it to reassure public and parliamentary opinion and reduce the pressure to suspend arms supplies to the FMG. In the war can only be described as chivalrous, old-fashioned though that word is. He agreed that his troops should be accompanied by U.N. observers, whose verdict on their conduct was favourable.' 70 But as seen below, there were still doubts about the observer team's objectivity and the extent to which its conclusions were credible.
Criticisms of the Observer Team
Despite the British government's faith in the observer team's findings, the team was criticised in Biafra and by its supporters in the UK and elsewhere. The Biafran government claimed it was 'nothing but a shameless conspiracy', aimed at preventing the UN and OAU 'from taking a positive stand or positive action against the genocide being practiced.' 71 Ojukwu claimed that the observer exercise would 'hardly achieve anything that can be presented to the world as original, accurate and impartial' so long as there are so few of them and their movements are restricted on the federal side. Cronje argues that the observer team was not neutral; it was not instructed on what genocide is nor how to identify it; it was dependent on the FMG for transport and accommodation; it never investigated the 1966 massacres of Igbos. 78 Indeed, at no point did the British government ever provide its observers with a definition of genocide, nor did it provide guidance on how one might determine whether or not a genocide was taking place or had taken place. 79 The observer team did refer to the Genocide Convention definition in one of its reports, 80 Nonetheless, the observer team -and the related pressure on the FMG by the UK government to moderate the level of violence -may have had some impact on the ground. Wilson later wrote that the observers' 'presence was designed to be a guarantee against "genocide"'. 82 This is not how it was presented initially, but the extent to which the UK's expressions of concern and its insistence on the observer team may have helped to prevent violence against civilians merits further research.
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The story of the observer team shows that the social norm against genocide had an impact on the British government: to continue with its policy of support for the FMG, including by supplying arms, it had to assuage public concerns about genocide. However, the story also illustrates the difficulty of providing 'objective' evidence regarding a purported ongoing genocide. The suspicion is that any observer team is simply there to confirm the views of the sending state/organisation.
Conclusion
This article has not taken a position on whether genocide was or was not perpetrated in Nigeria in the late 1960s; that is a matter for debate among historians and experts on the region. Instead, it has sought to show the power of language, and particularly, of one word. 'Genocide' is indeed so powerful that its usage is linked to the imperative to act to stop it. As Alain Destexhe has argued, genocide 'is the first and greatest of the crimes against humanity both because of its scale and the intent behind it: the destruction of a group. It is, therefore, a crime that obliges the international community to respond'. 83 Although there has long been controversy over what that response should entail (more recently, for example, the debate centres on military action with or without United Nations Security Council authorization), there has also long been an understanding that there should be an appropriate response. Wilson's government clearly felt and understood this pressure.
This, however, means that those governments, such as Wilson's, who are being pressed to 'take action' will try to avoid using the word -because if a situation is not genocide, then there is less pressure to do something. As we have seen in the case of the observer team to Nigeria, a decision to send an observer team to investigate whether genocide is ongoing or not, can be linked to protecting the interests of outside states not to intervene or change policy, which thus leads commentators and others to cast doubt on their objectivity.
This leads to a conundrum: if genocide is never acknowledged while it is possibly ongoing (so as to avoid having to respond to it), it will only ever be 'discovered' after the fact. One way out of this conundrum is for governments, international organizations and civil society to pay more attention to the task of preventing genocide (and other mass atrocities), entailing a shift in emphasis from short-term crisis response to long-term prevention. Numerous commentators have urged such a shift and there are indications of government response, as with the 2005 UN agreement on 'responsibility to protect', which includes the imperative to prevent mass atrocities, and the creation of the US Atrocities Prevention Board in 2011. 84 Prevention may thus become a higher priority for governments and international organizations.
1 The Igbos are an ethnic group originating in south-eastern Nigeria. In the past they were often (incorrectly) referred to as 'Ibos', as the sources cited in this article demonstrate. 
